Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 19

Issue 2

Article 2

4-1-2002

No Harm, No Foul: Abortion and the Implications of Fetal
Innocence
Kenneth Einar Himma

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Himma, Kenneth Einar (2002) "No Harm, No Foul: Abortion and the Implications of Fetal Innocence," Faith
and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 19 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200219222
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol19/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

NO HARM, NO FOUL: ABORTION AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF FETAL INNOCENCE
Kenneth Einar Himma

Christianity is generally thought to entail a pro-life position on abortion
rights. Since the fetus is a person, on this view, from the moment of conception, abortion is murder and hence should be legally prohibited. In this
essay, I will concede for the sake of argument the claims that the fetus is a
person and that abortion is murder, but I will argue that a Christian can
coherently hold that abortion should be legally permitted anyway. The
argument will principally be based on claims regarding the ultimate fate of
moral innocents and certain commonly accepted liberal views on the
boundaries of morally legitimate lawmaking authority.

It is commonly taken for granted that some set of tenets central to
Christianity entails what I will call the Conservative View of Abortion.
The essentials of this view are well known, so I will describe them only
briefly. According to the Conservative View, personhood begins at the
moment of conception'; conception, then, is the event that brings a new
person into the world - though its existence will obviously depend in a
very intimate way on its mother for a period of nine months. Since the
fetus is a person from the moment of conception, it has a right to life from
that moment on that is violated by abortion. Abortion, thus, constitutes
murder in violation of the Sixth Commandment and is hence always a sin.
The Conservative View, however, is not limited to taking a position on
the morality or sinfulness of abortion; it also involves a political position
with respect to what the law on abortion should be. This part of the view
is not always made explicit, but I take it that the essentials are as follows.
No state can be legitimate unless it protects innocent persons from grievous harm. Since the state is therefore morally obligated to prohibit the
intentional killing of innocent persons and abortion always involves the
intentional killing of an innocent person, it follows that the state is obligated to prohibit abortion.
In this essay, I attempt to construct an alternative to the Conservative
View. My efforts, however, will not require challenging the assumption
that the fetus is a person at the moment of conception. Indeed, I will
assume that this is true and hence that abortion is always murder, but
argue that a Christian can coherently hold that it should be permitted anyway.2 The argument will principally be based on claims regarding the ultimate fate of moral innocents and certain commonly accepted liberal views
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on the boundaries of morally legitimate lawmaking authority.
The analysis is intended not as a refutation of the Conservative View,
but as an attempt to construct a coherent liberal position on abortion out of
materials that are available to Christians. As an empirical matter, of
course, conservative Christians will likely reject some of these premises.
But, again, the point here is only to build a coherent pro-choice position on
the strength of religious, moral, and political doctrines that are still in play
among Christians. Thus, while I think the analysis here puts a difficult
question to the Conservative View, the reader who is expecting an attempt
to refute that view will be disappointed.
1. The Noncoincidellce Thesis

I begin with a thesis that I assume (and hope) is uncontroversial among
Christians:
The Noncoincidence Thesis: There are sins that cannot legitimately
be prohibited by the state.
The Noncoincidence Thesis, then, simply asserts that it is morally impermissible for the state to criminalize every sin. Insofar as the
Noncoincidence Thesis denies that the state has unlimited authority to prohibit and punish what is morally objectionable, it is a moral thesis about
the limits of the legitimate use of the state's coercive power.
A cursory inspection of the Ten Commandments discloses a number of
sins that are not legitimately restricted by the law and thus confirms the
plausibility of the Noncoincidence Thesis. For example, it would clearly be
illegitimate to criminalize the coveting of another person's goods or
spouse. One obvious problem with such a prohibition is that, in the vast
majority of instances, it is impossible to verify that a coveting has taken
place with sufficient reliability to warrant the application of coercive force.
Since, as a conceptual matter, a mere mental state is sufficient to constitute
an instance of coveting and since we lack direct access to the mental states
of others, there would be insurmountable epistemic difficulties involved in
enforcing such a prohibition.
There is another more serious difficulty. Even if we had an infallible
mind-reading device that could ethically be used, it would still be morally
problematic for the state to prohibit coveting. It is reasonable to think that
the state's coercive force may not legitimately be used to prohibit purely
private mental events. Believing something or feeling something may be
sinful, but it is not the proper business of the law to enforce the instantiation or non-instantiation of any particular mental state. The law is properly concerned with outward behaviors and not inner events; it is the
province of God, and not the province of the law, to judge the contents of a
person's mind in the absence of some outward behavioral manifestation.
It is also uncontrovcrsial, I think, that not every sinful outward behavior
can legitimately be prohibited. The state, for example, has no business
making it a crime to dishonor one's parents. Dishonoring a person is just
not the sort of behavior the state can legitimately prohibit - at least in the
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absence of some substantial injury to economic or reputational interests,
such as occurs when one person slanders another. While some instances of
dishonorings may involve these types of injury, the sort that is more common to the familial context involves a comparatively private insult that
does not culminate in economic or reputational injury. Put that together
with the view that the familial context deserves some insulation from state
regulation and we have a cogent argument for thinking the state should
not coercively enforce the Fifth Commandment.
Likewise, it would be illegitimate for the state to institutionalize either
the First Commandment by prohibiting other religions than Christianity or
the Fourth Commandment by prohibiting work on Sundays. Of course,
one might reasonably take issue with the extent of the separation between
church and state that has been read into the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court. Even so, the principle that
fallible human authorities ought generally to allow people to worship as
they see fit is an obvious constraint on legitimate lawmaking authority.
There is, I hope, nothing controversial about any of this. While most
Christians would probably like to see the state do more in the way of
enforcing morality, all but the most radically conservative would concede
that there are substantive limits on the state's authority to coercively
enforce Christian moral and theological commitments. Most, I trust,
would accept the analysis of the examples given above. But, in any event,
this much should be clear: there is nothing in the central tenets of
Christianity that precludes acceptance of the Noncoincidence Thesis.
Accordingly, Christians are free to adopt the Noncoincidence Thesis.
II. The Harm-to-Others and Offense Principles

Assuming the Noncoincidence Thesis is correct, the next issue is to determine the boundaries of legitimate lawmaking authority. Since the
Noncoincidence Thesis merely asserts that not every sin can legitimately be
criminaIized, it tells us very little about how the state may legitimately
exercise its lawmaking function and hence about whether abortion may
legitimately be prohibited. What we need, then, is a theory of morallegitimacy that distinguishes those sins that are legitimately criminalized from
those sins that are not.
The liberal tradition includes a number of different principles of moral
legitimacy that ultimately derive from the view that the state should
respect citizen autonomy. Some of these are, of course, procedural. Most,
if not all, liberal political theorists view democratic procedural constraints
as a necessary condition for moral legitimacy. On this familiar view, lawmaking authority is legitimate only to the extent that the lawmakers can
fairly be characterized as representing the interests of the people as a
whole. And this can occur only in a system where the lawmakers are
either the people themselves or are elected by the people in fair elections.
Put roughly, then, the underlying idea is that democratic procedures are
morally ideal only insofar as they respect the autonomy of citizens by
allowing them to participate in lawmaking activities and thereby to govern
themselves.
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But the liberal tradition also claims there are substantive limits to what
can legitimately be enacted into law by democratic processes. A regime is
no less totalitarian just because it is democratic. A system of laws that recognizes no limits on what can be required or prohibited by law is a totalitarian system - regardless of how such laws come into being. For example,
a norm that prohibits religious worship or bars women from the work
force is illegitimate even if it is enacted into law by democratic processes.
On this plausible view, which underlies the substantive protections of both
the United States Constitution and the Canadian Charter, there are limits
on the extent to which a democratic majority may legitimately restrict the
freedom of dissenting individuals.}
Ultimately underlying this view, as was true of the commitment to
democratic procedures, is a commitment to the moral importance of autonomy. Every law operates to restrict the behavior of some class of human
beings in some way and hence tends to undermine human autonomy.
Accordingly, every law involves some moral disvalue insofar as it undermines human autonomy. Indeed, it is for this very reason that anarchists
believe that the exercise of authority over any subject is necessarily inconsistent with respect for the subject's autonomy and must hence be morally
illegitimate. 4
Classical liberals, of course, reject the anarchist's claim that all authority
is illegitimate, but recognize, as they must, the tension between coercive
authority and autonomy, which provides the impetus for philosophical
theorizing about political legitimacy. There are a number of different
strategies for resolving the apparent tension between the two, but the one
that is relevant for our purposes attempts to identify a greater moral good
that outweighs the moral cost of restricting autonomy.
The most famous instance of this strategy presupposes that the moral
importance of public health and safety outweigh the moral cost of restricting autonomy. According to John Stuart Mill's Harm Principle, a behavior
can legitimately be restricted only insofar as such a restriction is instrumental to preventing harm to third parties:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.5
As a utilitarian, Mill must ground his views on the limits of legitimate lawmaking authority in an analysis of the effects of coercively restricting
autonomy on human well being. Accordingly, if the promotion of health
and safety justifies restricting autonomy, it must be because health and
safety are more vital to well being than respect for autonomy - a position
that may seem unintuitive in a culture that seems to privilege speech over
all other values, but is eminently sensible.
It is worth noting that there are two different thoughts in the passage
cited above; and while Mill apparently believes otherwise, they are not logically equivalent. The first is that legal restrictions on the behavior of other
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people can be justified only in terms of self-protection; the second is that
such justifications must make reference to the prevention of harm to others. While the second entails the first, the converse does not hold - at least
not if "harm" is construed in the ordinary sense. For the interest in selfprotection might not be limited to the interest in protection from harm as
Mill conceives it. Although Mill probably intends his Harm Principle as
concerned exclusively with physical and economic harm, there are other
sorts of threat that might justify coercive precautions.
Joel Feinberg, for example, argues for the Offense Principle, according to
which behavior may legitimately be restricted to avoid offense to others.
Feinberg describes the Offense Principle as follows:
It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective way of preventing serious
offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the
actor, and that it is probably a necessary means to that end (i.e., there
is probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost
to other values). The principle asserts, in effect, that the prevention of
offensive conduct is properly the state's business.6

Like the Harm Principle, the Offense Principle rationalizes legal restriction
of freedom as a form of self-protection. On this view, legal restrictions on
behavior can be justified as a means of preventing" any or all of a miscellany of disliked mental states (disgust, shame, hurt, anxiety, etc.)" resulting
from the conduct of others.' Thus, for example, the Offense Principle justifies the prohibition of public nudity on the ground that such behavior is
likely to cause offense to third parties.
The claim that the Harm and Offense Principles exhaust the substantive
limits of legitimate lawmaking authority comprises what I will call the
Protection Thesis.' Though the Protection Thesis is often thought of as
being a modern view, it has been around for many centuries and has been
accepted by many Christian thinkers. For example, Peter Abelard held
that "all sins are of the mind only," but nonetheless argued that punishment should be reserved for outward manifestations of culpable mental
states that result in harm:
Injury to the soul we do not regard as so much a matter for punishment as injury to others. Our object is to avoid public mischief, rather
than to correct personal mistakes.... Everything which is likely to
lead to common loss or to public harm must be punished by a greater
requital. Where a sin involves more serious injury the penalty must
therefore be heavier. The greater the social stumbling-block, the
more stringent must be the social correction, even though the original
guilt be relatively lighU
This passage indicates Abelard accepts both of the two premises I have
argued for up until now. Given that sins resulting in no common loss or
public harm should not be punished, as the passage above indicates, it follows that, on Abelard's view, not every sin should be punished; thus,
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Abelard clearly accepts the Noncoincidence Thesis. Second, given that
"injury to others" is the test of whether a behavior should be punished
(and hence prohibited by a criminal law), it follows that Abelard accepts
the Protection Thesis.
Like Mill, then, Abelard appears to view the function of law as public
protection, leaving the judgment of sin to God. As Abelard puts the point:
We reserve, therefore, sins of the soul for the divine judgment.. .. The
degree of contempt displayed by men to God is afterwards proportionately punished, whatever be their condition or calling.... It is the
soul in its scheme of intention, not in the outward result of its action,
that God assesses. III
Thus, whereas human beings may punish publicly harmful manifestations
of inward sinful states, it is the province of God to judge a person's moral
character.
There are, of course, difficulties associated with the Protection Thesis. In
particular, it is not immediately clear how to articulate a coherent set of
principles that distinguishes those harms and offenses that justify restricting freedom from those that do not justify restricting freedom. But this is
just a specific instance of a general problem that afflicts most attempts to
make some moral principle precise and hence should not be considered a
fatal objection against the Protection Thesis.
In any event, my point here is to describe, in admittedly rough terms, a
particular account of legitimacy that can viably be held by Christians - and
not to defend it. Given that the Protection Thesis coheres well with existing constitutional practice, it is a plausible position. Given that there is
nothing in the central doctrines of Christianity that precludes accepting the
Protection Thesis, it is open to a Christian to accept it - as many have.
Thus, the claim that the Harm and Offense Principles exhaust the substantive moral limits on democratic lawmaking authority remains a viabJe
position for Christians.

TlI. The Doctrine of Juvenile Innocence
As it turns out, it is surprisingly difficult for a wholly secularist approach
to justify a legal prohibition of killing under the Protection Thesis in a way
that harmonizes with our intuitions. If what justifies a law restricting
killing is the harm it causes to the victim, it is difficult to see why the law
should regard intentional killing as presumptively wrong. For if the killing
is administered in a painless way, something that is easy enough to accomplish, it can plausibly be argued that the victim has not incurred any harm.
First, if, as some philosophers believe, harm cannot exist without being
experienced in some way," the secularist seems committed to claiming that
the victim of a painless killing sustains no harm - either during or after the
killing. Second, if, as other philosophers believe, harm must be instantiated by a living subject,12 the victim's premature death does not constitute a
harm; for the victim is no longer the sort of entity that can instantiate
harm. 13
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This, of course, is not to deny that there will nearly always be harmful
third-party effects resulting from a killing. A murder victim is likely to
have friends and relatives who sustain considerable pain as a result of the
crime. Obviously, the loss of a friend produces considerable mental suffering to other persons in the form of grief. Less obviously, the loss of a friend
may have the effect of making one painfully aware of one's vulnerabilityan effect that is exacerbated when the friend's death results from a violent
crime.
But the idea that a law criminalizing murder must be justified entirely
on the strength of these sorts of third-party effects does not do justice to
our intuitions about why intentional killing should be prohibited in circumstances not involving defense against a culpable threat to life. First, of
course, whether a killing results in third-party effects will depend on the
contingent circumstances of the victim. A killing will not cause appreciable third-party harm if the victim lacks friends and relatives, but the
absence of third party effects surely would not justify permitting a murder.
Second, and more importantly, a theory that justifies legally prohibiting
murder entirely in terms of third-party effects cannot make sense of the
idea that what justifies such laws is the harm that murder causes to the victim. While, as a practical matter, third-party effects will justify prohibiting
the vast majority of intentional killings, reference to third-party effects cannot explain our strong intuition that intentional killing should generally be
prohibited to protect potential victims. 14
Here the Christian theorist has access to resources that the secularist
lacks. Unlike the secularist attracted to the Protection Thesis, the Christian
can argue that the killing of a moral person always, indeed necessarily,
involves a substantial harm to the victim. On this line of reasoning, killing
a moral person necessarily results in harm by subjecting her to the risk of
being judged by God before she has fully accepted the essential Christian
doctrines. Whether one interprets hell literally as involving the subjection
of the soul or resurrected body to unending torment or whether one
instead interprets hell as involving an eternal separation from God, there is
no greater harm, according to Christianity, to which one can be subjected. IS
And it is important to realize that the justification for legally prohibiting
murder under the Protection Thesis does not depend on the outcome of
God's judgment. It is no defense for a drunk driver to say "Well, I didn't
hurt anyone; so I shouldn't be punished." While it might be true that the
drunk driver did not hit anyone, it is also true that she might have.
Likewise, it is no defense for her to say "Well, she went to heaven anyway;
so there are no grounds to blame or punish me" - even assuming a murderer could know this about his victim. While it might be true that the victim does not wind up in hell, it is also true that she might have. The
Protection Thesis, as it is most plausibly construed, justifies the legal
restriction of any behavior that subjects third parties to an unreasonable
risk of harm.
Thus, while it is difficult to make a secularist argument linking the
Harm and Offense Principles, which exhaust the limits of legitimate lawmaking authority under the Protection Thesis, with a general prohibition
on killing in a way that harmonizes with our intuitions, no such difficulty
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exists for the Christian philosopher. Intentional killing should be prohibited in nearly every circumstance because it necessarily subjects the victim to
a risk of the gravest harm of all- the risk of eternal damnation. And that is
a harm that is rightly protected against by the state.

IV. Fetal Innocence and Abortion Law
It turns out, however, that the view that killing necessarily subjects the victim to the risk of eternal damnation is subject to one important class of
exceptions. Insofar as culpability presupposes moral know ledge, someone
who lacks moral knowledge through no fault of her own is incapable of culpability and is hence exempt from divine punishment. Thus, for example,
someone who instantiates a severe cognitive disability is saved without
regard to either her behavior or her attitude towards Christian doctrine.
Such a person is saved no matter how she behaves or what she believes.
The same is true of children before they have developed the capacity for
moral reasoning. Such persons are incapable of culpability in either deed
or belief and, as Abelard puts the point, "are saved without merit of their
own, as for instance, infants, and attain eternal life by grace alone."lh
Accordingly, under the assumption that fetuses are persons at the moment
of conception and are hence the bearers of moral rights (though obviously
not of moral obligations), it follows that fetuses that die before birth are, as
a matter of moral necessity, saved without regard to personal merit.
One might nonetheless be tempted to think that premature death results
in some harm to the fetus. After all, premature death results in the loss of a
worldly life that admittedly has its charms: family, community, romantic
and sexual love, art, sport, and knowledge are all among the goods that
make life worth living. Indeed, Don Marquis argues that what makes
abortion wrong is that it deprives the fetus of exactly these sorts of goods:

[T]he misfortune of premature death consists of the loss to us of the
future goods of consciousness. What are those goods? Much can be
said about this issue, but a simple answer will do for the purposes of
this essay. The goods of life are whatever we get out of life. The
goods of life are those items toward which we take a pro attitude.
They are completed projects of which we are proud, the pursuit of
our goals, aesthetic enjoyments, friendships, intellectual pursuits, and
physical pleasures of various sorts. The goods of life are what make
life worth living. 17
Thus, Marquis concludes, what makes abortion wrong is that it deprives
the fetus of "a future like ours" - regardless of whether the fetus is a moral
person.
Intriguingly, there is a sense in which the Christian theorist is in a better
position than the secularist to take advantage of this sort of strategy. As a
practical matter, secularist philosophers are considerably less likely than
Christian philosophers to hold a form of substance dualism. To the extent
that a Christian accepts the existence of souls that survive the death of the
body, she can straightforwardly attribute a harm to the fetus's soul that
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results from premature death. Thus, whereas the secularist runs into trouble trying to identify a locus for the harm that is caused by death, the
Christian encounters no difficulty on this score: the locus of the harm is the
persisting soul of the prematurely deceased fetus.
Although Christianity's commitment to substance dualism makes possible such a line of argument, it is nonetheless untenable. The powerful
response to the argument recalls Pascal's famous reasoning. Since the
rewards a worldly life offers are always finite, it follows that the harm that
results from being deprived of such a life is also finite. On the other hand,
the benefit of what is essentially a free pass to heaven is infinite.
Accordingly, whatever harm results from a premature death under such
circumstances is infinitely outweighed by the benefit that results from an
immediate and infinite salvation.
Indeed, it can plausibly be argued that premature death conduces maximally to the fetus's self-interest. To see this, imagine yourself in the following sihlation. While in the womb, you are temporarily made fully rational
and offered the choice between a premature death and an opportunity to
live a worldly life. The choice is expressed as follows. Should you choose a
premature death, you will immediately experience a profound and eternal
bliss - an ecstasy beyond any possible in this world. Should you choose an
opportunity to live a worldly life, you will be judged at the end of your life
for your deeds and beliefs. If you are judged favorably, you gain eternal
bliss; if not, you will suffer eternal torment. You are also told there are
many temptations that may lead you down a path that culminates in an
unfavorable judgment so that the risk of such torment at the end of your
worldly life is substantial. Finally, you are told that, after having made your
choice, you will forget everything that you have been told. Assume that
you have no idea whatsoever of what your post-natal circumstances will be.
What should you do?"
The odds of a favorable judgment after a worldly life are probably not in
your favor. While I would very much like to believe that we will all eventually find our way to God, this is not a common view among Christians.
Indeed, when I ask students to estimate the percentage of people in the
world who are likely to go to heaven, the most common response ranges
from 10 to 15%.'9 The vast majority of us, on this view, have the unending
torments of damnation ahead of us.
But the probability of a favorable judgment does not matter as long as it
is less than 1. The smallest chance of an unfavorable judgment multiplied
by the infinite cost attached to that judgment results in an infinite expected
cost. No matter how good your worldly life might be, the expected benefit
is finite. Thus, the expected value of choosing a worldly life is infinitely
negative. Since the expected value of choosing premature death is infinitely
positive, the only rational thing to do from the standpoint of self-interest is
to choose premature death.,o21
The blatantly self-interested character of the argument will undoubtedly
appear counterintuitive and even repugnant to many readers. But a good
part of religious motivation is rooted in self-interested desires for meaning,
spiritual communion, peace of mind, and immortality; and this is a common theme among Christian thinkers. At the foundation of Kierkegaard's
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strong fideism, for example, is the characterization of Christianity's import
entirely in terms of self-interest. In distinguishing between what he calls
the objective and subjective problems, Kierkegaard writes:
The objective problem is: Is Christianity true? The subjective problem is: What is the individual's relationship to Christianity? Quite
simply, how may I, Johannes Climacus, participate in the happiness
promised by Christianity" (413)?22
On Kierkegaard's view, then, what should really matter to the Christian is
how to achieve the happiness associated with salvation and not whether
Christian doctrine is objectively true. And in this connection it is worth
noting that, while we may tend to resist such claims, we do not shy away
from them when we proselytize: appeals to unbelievers typically make reference to the consequences of sin to well being. 23
It is, of course, understandable why we do not like to acknowledge the
role of self-interest in religious motivation. Any appeal to self-interest in
religious motivation seems to diminish the sincerity of religious faith. The
idea, for example, that Mother Theresa was motivated in all she did ultimately by a desire for salvation would rightly change our judgments about
her exemplary character. For insofar as this is true, all that she did to alleviate suffering in the world would have been motivated by a selfish desire to
secure her own advantage.
To say that self-interest forms an important part of religious motivation,
however, is not to say that it exhausts such motivation. Nor is it to say that
it reduces all religious sentiment to some sort of calculating attempt to maximize one's well being over the long term - any more than recognizing that
self-interested motivation plays a role in romantic love reduces all romantic
sentiment to such self-serving calculations. Even so, it is hard to deny that
self-interest is an inescapable part of what we are both in faith and in the
world.',! But, in any event, it should be clear that, from the standpoint of
Christian ethics, a self-interested concern with our own salvation is a perfectly acceptable reason for seeking a relationship with God. Accordingly,
and notwithstanding the strong temptation to think otherwise, there is
nothing ethically problematic in thinking that there is a sense in which,
from the standpoint of fetal self-interest, premature death is a blessing.
What this means, then, is that if the Protection Thesis is taken as the standard that distinguishes sins that should be legally prohibited from sins that
should be legally permitted, then abortion is a sin that should be legally permitted. Since harm, in the relevant sense, must be considered from the
standpoint of the typical victim of an act and since the expected value to the
fetus of being aborted is infinite, it seems to follow that abortion, though
sinful, should be legally permitted. If this is correct, then we have constructed a coherent pro-choice position entirely out of materials that are
available to sincere Christians.
At this point, one might be tempted to object that this analysis implies
women ought to do their fetuses a favor and have abortions, but nothing of
this sort follows. Tt is important to remember that this line of argument
begins by conceding the sinful character of abortion; the conclusion is tl1.at
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abortion, though always morally wrong, should be legally permitted. And
the sinful nature of abortion provides a strong self-interested motive for a
woman not to have an abortion. No matter how much benefit may accrue
to the fetus, it does not mitigate the fact that committing an offense against
God can never, all things considered, be in a person's sel£-interest. 25
Further, the sinful character of abortion provides a conclusive moral
motive not to have an abortion. No matter how much benefit may accrue
to the fetus and how benign the mother's motive in having an abortion,
abortion remains a sin against God.'" For this reason, the balance of moral
and self-interested reasons necessarily operates against having an abortion.
And, as far as most choice advocates are concerned, this is as it should
be. The vast majority of choice advocates concede the moral undesirability
of abortion: abortion is always a morally objectionable outcome that
should be discouraged. This, of course, is a judgment that such persons
share with choice opponents. What the choice advocate denies is that the
moral undesirability of abortion rises to the level of something that should
be legally prohibited by the state. On the standard choice position, the
fetus is not a person and hence does not have any right to life that could be
infringed by an abortion. Thus, while choice opponents often seem not to
realize this, the conviction that abortion is immoral is an important component of the standard defense of abortion rights. And that concession is also
an important component of the abortion position described here.

V. Objections and Replies
A. Abortion and the Offense Principle

The first objection is a comparatively minor one. One might argue that a
law prohibiting abortion can be justified by the Offense Principle. On this
line of reasoning, allowing abortion will cause profound offense to opponents of abortion rights. For such persons, the very knowledge that abortions are being performed in the community is sufficient to cause precisely
the sort of mental discomfort that the Offense Principle is intended to prevent. 111us, the argument concludes, if the Protection Thesis is true (i.e., that
the Offense and Harm Principles exhaust the substantive limits of legitimate
lawmaking authority), it follows that abortion should be legally prohibited.
The problem with this objection is that it misconstrues the scope of the
Offense Principle as justifying the legal restriction of any conduct causing
in third parties one of the disagreeable states that constitutes being offended. But, as proponents understand it, the scope of the Offense Principle is
limited to protecting against offense that results from behaviors that are
public in the sense of being reasonably observable by others. Thus, for
example, the Offense Principle would justify prohibiting public nudity on
the ground it would likely cause offense to others, but it would not justify
prohibiting nudity in a hotel room or in one's home no matter how much
offense such behavior might cause to others. The Offense Principle is a
standard that governs public behavior and not private behavior.
Here it is worth remembering that the point of the Offense Principle, like
the Harm Principle, is to define substantive constraints on democratic lawmaking authority. To construe the Offense Principle as reaching every
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behavior, regardless of whether it is public or private, is inconsistent with
this intent. For if enough people are moved by mental distress of some sort
to vote to prohibit some purely private behavior (such as nudity in any
other room than a bathroom), then the Offense Principle would justify
restricting that behavior. But this seems simply to leave it up to the democratic majority to decide what behaviors should be prohibited and permitted;
for, as a practical matter, the occurrence of behaviors a person wants prohibited usually cause her significant mental distress. Accordingly, this construction seems to imply that there are no content-based limits whatsoever
on democratic lawmaking - and is thus inconsistent with the substantive
intuitions that motivate the Offense Principle. 27
B. Might Abortion Result in the Loss of Souls?
The second objection seeks to identify a harm caused by abortion that justifies protective measures under the Harm Principle. This objection begins
with the observation that we cannot know at exactly what point in the
pregnancy the fetus acquires a soul and hence becomes a person. 2S If
ensoulment takes place later on in the pregnancy, then it is possible to have
an abortion prior to ensoulment. The worry here is that if the fetus is
aborted prior to ensoulment and the creation of the soul occurs at the
moment of ensoulment, then the abortion prevents the creation of the soul
that would have inhabited the fetus. Thus, a pre-ensoulment abortion
actually harms the would-be person by keeping its soul from being created. Since we cannot know exactly when abortions can be performed without causing such harms, all abortions should be legally prohibited. 24
This intriguing objection reverses a popular strategy employed by opponents of abortion rights. Like the objection above, this strategy begins with
the claim that we are not in a position to know exactly when during a pregnancy personhood begins. Since, on this line of reasoning, we cannot
know when personhood begins and since post-personhood abortions are
murder, we should prohibit all abortions to preclude the possibility of
murdering unborn persons. But whereas this line of reasoning attempts to
prevent a harm that would result if an abortion is performed after ensoulment, the ingenious objection described above attempts to prevent a harm
that might result if an abortion is performed before ensoulment.
There is a straightforward response to this objection. Assuming that a
pre-ensoulment abortion would prevent a soul from coming into existence,
no harm can result because there is clearly nothing to serve as the locus of
harm. It is conceptually impossible to harm a soul that does not exist.
While I do not think the point needs defense here, it should be noted that
the contrary assumption has a number of absurd moral implications. It
implies, for example, that a couple that decides against having children
wrongs the souls that would have existed if the couple had attempted to
conceive?' Moreover, it implies that a person who decides to remain celibate for spiritual reasons wrongs the souls that would have existed had he
or she decided not to remain celibate. If these consequences do not provide a conclusive refutation of this line of criticism, they certainly provide
reasonable grounds for someone who wishes to defend a pro-choice view
to reject the criticism.
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C. Third-Party Hanns
One might argue that even if abortion does not cause harm to the fetus, it
does cause harm to third parties. 3l On this line of reasoning, abortions frequently result in profound emotional distress to the mother that often has
disastrous effects on marriages and families. 32 Accordingly, if the
Protection Thesis is true, then a legal restriction of abortion is justified as a
means of preventing these harmful effects.
There are a number of responses to this objection. Assuming these contested claims about the psychological consequences of abortion are correct,
they do not entail that abortion should be prohibited under the Harm
Principle. To begin with, it is not enough to justify a legal prohibition that
abortion causes some psychological harm. Forcing an unwilling mother to
carry a pregnancy to term also causes considerable psychological harm and that is why there is an issue here to begin with. What would have to
be shown to justify a restriction of abortion under the Harm Principle is
that the psychological harm caused to mothers by allowing abortion is
greater than the psychological harm caused to mothers by prohibiting abortion.~~ All things considered, it is reasonable at this point in time to think
that allowing abortion is, as far as the Harm Principle is concerned, the
lesser of the two evils.
The more serious problem, however, is that the Harm Principle does not
operate to prevent harms that people do to themselves. As Mill forcefully
puts it:

His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant.
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in
the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right. There are
good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the
conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to
produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is,
of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign (OL 13).
Accordingly, the harm that the mother causes to herself, no matter how
profound, would not be a legitimate ground for restricting her freedom
under the Harm Principle. Paternalistic reasons, on this view, can never
justify restricting a person's freedom.
One might respond that the harm caused to fathers by abortion would justify restricting abortion under the Harm Principle. This argument suffers
from the same defect as the last. To justify restricting abortion under the
Harm Principle, it would have to be shown that the psychological harm
caused to fathers by allowing abortion is greater than the psychological
harm caused to fathers by prohibiting abortion. As should be obvious,
unwilling fathers suffer a great deal of psychological distress from having to
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bear responsibility for lU1we1come children. But it is worth noting that even
if this can be shown (an unlikely prospect, I think), it would justify, at most, a
law requiring the consent of both mother and father as a precondition for
allowing an abortion. It would not justify a complete prohibition on abortion because, as we noted above, the Harm Principle does not justify protecting people from harmful risks that they vollU1tarily and knowingly assume.
D. Original Sin and Fetal Innocence
A fourth objection attempts a different strategy for showing that abortion
results in harm to the fetus. On this line of argument, all persons are
stained by original sin and hence cannot be saved without the sacrament of
baptism. The Catholic Encyclopedia describes this doctrine as follows:
Theologians distinguish a twofold necessity, which they call a necessity of means (medii) and a necessity of precept (prcecepti). The first
(medii) indicates a thing to be so necessary that, if lacking (though
inculpably), salvation can not be attained; the second (prcecepti) is had
when a thing is indeed so necessary that it may not be omitted vollU1tarily without sin; yet, ignorance of the precept or inability to fulfill it,
excuses one from its observance. Baptism is held to be necessary
both necessitate medii and prcecepti.... Christ makes no exception to
this law and it is therefore general in its application, embracing both
adults and infants. It is consequently not merely a necessity of precept but also a necessity of means. 34
It follows, according to this doctrine, that "infants who ... depart this life

without baptism, be it of water, or blood, or desire, are perpetually excluded from the vision of God."35 No injustice occurs here because "[o]riginal
sin deprived the human race of an unearned right to heaven."'"
Like the preceding line of objection, this one concedes for the sake of
argument that the Harm Principle defines the limits of legitimate lawmaking authority, but denies that it operates in support of legalizing abortion.
Since, according to this argument, fetuses that die without baptism are
eternally excluded from the vision of God, they sustain a profolU1d injury.37
Whether "perpetual exclusion from the vision of God" involves the torments of hell or the deprivation caused by separation from God, it involves
an injury that is infinite because eternal in duration. Thus, contra my argument, the Harm Principle implies that abortion should be legally prohibited to protect fetuses from such injury.
Many Christians, of course, reject the view that baptism is necessary for
salvation. John Calvin, for example, wrote:
Now, consequently, we must utterly reject the fiction of those who
consign all the lU1baptized to eternal death.... Nowhere do we find
that [the Lord] has ever condemned anyone as yet lU1baptized. I do
not want anyone on this accolU1t to think of me as meaning that baptism can be despised with impunity ... ; it merely suffices to prove that
baptism is not so necessary that one from whom the capacity to obtain
it has been taken away should straightaway be cOlU1ted as losUB
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Accordingly, Calvin concludes that "infants are not barred from the
Kingdom of Heaven just because they happen to depart the present life
before they have been immersed in water."39
There are a number of plausible theological and philosophical paths to
this conclusion. One can, for example, reject the view of original sin
grounding the claim that baptism is necessary for salvation. On this line of
reasoning, the doctrine of original sin should not be construed as imputing
guilt or culpability to persons. Rather it should be construed as an explanation of why we are psychologically so susceptible to temptation. Since
original sin, then, does not result in guilt or culpability on the part of the
fetus, baptism is not necessary as a neutralizing response.'o Alternatively,
one can reject the idea that third-party intervention is necessary for salvation. On this view, while the church serves valuable instrumental purposes (such as providing education), there is no need for the intervention of a
church authority in the relationship between God and the believer. Finally,
and more philosophically, one can reject the idea that a morally perfect
God would penalize a person, such as a fetus, who is incapable of moral
agency. But no matter how one reaches this conclusion, the result for our
purposes is the same: assuming the fetus is a person, a fetus who dies prematurely gets the infinite benefit of, so to speak, a free pass to heaven.
While I find this latter view considerably more plausible than the view
that baptism is necessary for salvation, there is no need to defend this point
here. As will be recalled, my point here is merely to show how a prochoice position can be constructed, even under the assumption that the
feius is a person, out of materials available to a Christian. To the extent
that there is nothing in the core of Christian doctrine that entails that innocents who die without the grace of baptism are thereby excluded from the
vision of God, it is open to a sincere Christian to deny that doctrineY
E. The Infanticide Objection
The most serious objection to my argument is that it would also justify a
law permitting infanticide. As I have argued, permitting abortion is consistent with the Harm Principle because premature death infinitely benefits
the fetus by providing a free pass to heaven; as will be recalled, fetuses are
saved in virtue of their innocence. But exactly the same sort of argument
can be made with respect to infants. Since infants are no more capable of
sin than fetuses, it follows, according to this line of analysis, that premature
death also infinitely benefits an infant by providing her with a free pass to
heaven. Thus, it would seem to follow that if permitting abortion is consistent with the Harm Principle, then so is permitting infanticide.
There are a couple of ways to respond to this worry. First, one can simply hold that infanticide should be legally permitted at least within a period in which one can be certain that the infant lacks the sorts of cognitive
abilities that would render her culpable and hence at risk for eternal
damnation. 42 On this view, since the Harm and Offense Principles exhaust
the limits of legitimate lawmaking authority and since infanticide does not
result in harm to the infant, it follows it that would be illegitimate for a
state to prohibit infanticide - no matter how profoundly sinful it might be.
I think that even the most radically liberal Christian should adamantly
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refuse to bite this bullet. While it is worth emphasizing that conservative
and liberal Christians can comfortably accept many of the premises in my
argument, the implication that infanticide should be legally permitted
would rightly strike the vast majority of Christians as an obvious reductio of
one of the premises in the argument. TI1US, this sort of analysis cannot serve
as a viable foundation for a Christian pro-choice position unless we can
show that it does not entail that infanticide should be legally permitted.
To this end, one might attempt to distinguish infanticide from abortion
in the following way. Whereas abortion necessarily implicates a mother's
interests in her health and reproductive privacy, infanticide does not. Thus,
while abortion rights are necessary to enable a woman to realize these
interests in the context of an ongoing pregnancy, infanticide rights do not
uniquely conduce to the realization of any legitimate interests a mother
may have. Whatever legitimate interests, if any, a mother may have in not
parenting her infant can be realized by putting the child up for adoption.
This important difference, the argument concludes, justifies treating infanticide differently from abortion.
For my purposes, the problem with this analysis is that it abandons the
approach that I have adopted here. In particular, it abandons the thesis
that the Harm and Offense Principles exhaust the substantive limits of
democratic lawmaking authority. Regardless of what maternal interests
are implicated by abortion and infanticide cases, it nonetheless remains
true that premature death results in an infinite benefit to a moral innocent
- and should hence be allowed if the only relevant principles are the Harm
and Offense Principles. To make out this case, one would have to supplement these principles with another standard that distinguishes legitimate
from illegitimate maternal interests and limits the application of the Harm
Principle to cases implicating the former."
A more promising response focuses on the harmful effects of allowing
infanticide." On this line of reasoning, societal tolerance for the killing of
even newborn infants would have the effect of diminishing the respect that
we have for human life in general and hence would be likely to increase
rates of violent crime. Thus, allowing infanticide even in limited circumstances would have psychological effects that are likely to result in an
increase of violence against people who are morally culpable and hence are
at risk of eternal damnation.
The reason for this is that the physical similarities between infants and
older persons playa profound psychological role in forming our ethical
judgments with respect to the treatment of both. As Jane English explains
this important connection:
Our psychological constitution makes it the case that for our ethical
theory to work, it must prohibit certain treatment of non-persons
which are significantly person-like. If our moral rules allowed people to treat person-like non-persons in ways we do not want people
to be treated, this would undermine the system of sympathies and
attitudes that makes the ethical system work."'
The idea here is a natural one: our ethical judgments about and behavior
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towards non-infants are shaped in part by our ethical judgments about
infants because of the conspicuous physical similarities between the two.
Thus, to the extent that we legally permit the killing of infants, we are making more likely the killing of older persons who are subject to the risk of
eternal damnation. Accordingly, a law prohibiting infanticide is justified
under the Protection Thesis as a means of preventing this great harm.
At this point, the choice opponent is likely to object that this sort of reasoning applies equally to abortions. It is clear, for example, that a nearly
nine-month-old fetus bears a conspicuous physical similarity to a newborn
infant and hence to children and adults. Indeed, English concedes this very
point: "A fetus one week before birth is so much like a newborn baby in our
psychological space that we cannot allow any cavalier treatment of the former while expecting full sympathy and nutritive support for the latter" (ACP
241).46 Accordingly, the choice opponent argues that if the physical similarities between infants and older persons justify restricting infanticide under
the Protection Thesis, then the physical similarities between older fetuses
and infants justify restricting late-term abortions under the Protection Thesis.
As it turns out, this line of pro-life argument has the effect of making the
liberal position I am defending here more rather than less reasonable. It
would be an embarrassment for the argument I have described if it
allowed third-trimester abortions; for most choice advocates, Christian and
non-Christian alike, support abortion rights only during the early stages of
pregnancy. Indeed, the idea that abortions should be legally permitted up
to the day of delivery is, on my view, profoundly objectionable. Thus, likeminded liberal Christians would, quite frankly, be relieved to concede that
this line of argument provides a strong harm-based reason for a legal ban
on both infanticide and third-trimester abortions.
But it is important to note that such an argument will not support a ban
on early-term abortions w1der the Protection Thesis. As English persuasively puts the point:

Remember, however, that in the early weeks after conception a fetus
is very much unlike a person. It is hard to develop these feelings for
a set of genes which doesn't yet have a head, hands, beating heart,
response to touch or the ability to move by itself. Thus it seems to me
that the alleged "slippery slope" between conception and birth is not
so very slippery. In the early stages of pregnancy, abortion can hardly be compared to murder for psychological reasons, but in the latest
stages it is psychologically akin to murder (ACP 241-242).
While the issue of where to draw the line is a difficult one, it seems clear that
the line cannot plausibly be drawn in the first trimester. Thus, a liberalminded Christian can coherently take a pro-choice position with respect to
abortions during the first trimester and during the beginning of the second
trimester.
VI. Conclusions

In this essay, I have attempted to show how a pro-choice position can be
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constructed out of materials that are available in good faith to sincere
Christians. I have argued that if the death of someone incapable of culpability results in a free pass to heaven, the premature death of a fetus results
in no harm to the fetus. Thus, if the Protection Thesis is true, then abortion
can legitimately be permitted - even on the strong assumption that the
fetus is a person.
Now it is one thing to say that a position is coherent and another thing
to say that it can sensibly be adopted. While I think the position elaborated
here is coherent and consistent with the core of Christian doctrine, I am not
sure I would characterize this as the most sensible way to take a pro-choice
position. The reader may be heartened to know that, while I find this line
of reasoning quite interesting, I am also made extremely uncomfortable by
it. Though it is hard for me to pinpoint exactly what is bothering me about
the argument (since I find all of the premises extremely plausible)/7 my
emotional response leads me away from it as a front-line defense of abortion rights.
Nevertheless, I think these considerations do have a sensible place in a
pro-choice position. Many Christians adopt a pro-choice position on exactly the kinds of argument that ground the pro-choice views of nonChristians. Some Christians take the view that the fetus is not a person
until later on in the pregnancys; others take the view that considerations of
reproductive autonomy operate in favor of permitting abortion!" I happen
to think these views are, in the relevant sense of the term, sensible positions that can (and should) be taken by conscientious Christians.
By my lights, the most sensible role for the argument described here is
as something that augments these legitimate grounds for supporting abortion rights. One can argue that even if it turns out, for example, that the
fetus is a person at the moment of conception,so there is no harm that can
possibly result from an abortion to the fetus. Likewise, the claim that the
fetus is not harmed by abortion entails that the effects of abortion on fetuses cannot be used as a counterweight to considerations of reproductive
autonomy. Accordingly, the potential harm to the fetus is nullified as a
ground for objecting to these pro-choice arguments.
Of course, these maneuvers are not likely to placate strongly pro-life
Christians or make a pro-choice position more comfortable. But there is
nothing particularly special in this regard about my approach. Christian
and non-Christian choice advocates frequently experience a good deal of
discomfort with their positions; the moral significance of the fetus weighs
heavily in the balance of reasons - as it should. Such discomfort, then,
comes with the territory. And there is little that can be said to change the
fact that choice opponents frequently find pro-choice views profoundly
offensive (though one would like to see a more deeply felt appreciation on
the part of choice opponents for the moral significance of reproductive
autonomy). Like gay rights, the death penalty, euthanasia, and any other
interesting moral issue, the issue of abortion gives rise to views that will
always provoke discomfort of some kind. It is not an objection to the view
I defend here that it cannot alleviate those inevitable pains and frictions."
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NOTES
1. Of course, there is little in the way of Biblical evidence on the issue one
way or another.
.
2. James S. Spiegel argues that a Christian can be morally pro-life and
politically pro-choice only to the extent that "(a) [she] holds the [morally prolife] view to be justifiable by theological reasons alone and (b) [she] believes the
theological evidence to be only minimally sufficient to justify the [morally prolife view]." See James S. Spiegel, "Can a Christian be Coherently Morally ProLife and Politically Pro-Choice?" Christian Scholar's Review, vol. 30, no. 1 (Fall
2000), 107-115, 115. The idea is that such a combination of positions is coherent
only in the face of certain kinds of epistemic doubt about the morality of abortion. Though Spiegel is not a specific target of this paper, the arguments I
make, if sound, show his view is incorrect.
3. Presumably, a person may consent to the state's enacting restrictions on
her own freedom.
4. For an outstanding discussion of the various issues implicated by the
anarchist critique of authority, see Scott Shapiro, Authority," forthcoming in
Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence
and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
5. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 12.
Hereinafter referred to as OL.
6. Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others (New York: Oxford University Press,
1985), l.
7. Feinberg, Offense to Others, 1.
8. The Harm Principle, then, should be understood as asserting only that
it is permissible for the state to prohibit behaviors that cause harm to others.
Thus, this construction does not entail Mill's view that the prevention of harm
is the only legitimate grOlmd for restricting freedom.
9. Abelard's Ethics, translated by J. Ramsay McCallum (Merrick, NY:
Richwood Publishing Co., 1976); excerpted in Andrew B. Schoedinger,
Readings in Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 121142,132. All references are to the Schoedinger volume.
U

10. Abelard's Ethics, 132.
11. Peter Singer takes this view, arguing that the capacity for sentience is a
precondition for having interests. See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New
York: Random House, 1975).
12. See Kenneth E. Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," Journal
of Philosophy, vol. 75, no. 6 (June 1978),308-325.
13. Since my approach is not secularist, it does not depend on either of
these assumptions.
14. One can see a related difficulty emerging in Peter Singer's views on the
moral standing of animals. Singer, as is well known, rejects the idea that it is
the capacity for abstract reasoning that gives rise to moral standing. On
Singer's view, any being that is vulnerable to harm because it is capable of suffering has a claim to have its interests considered in the deliberations of moral
agents. Since non-human animals are capable of suffering, it follows that nonhuman animals are entitled to what he calls equal consideration: "If a being
suffers, there can be no justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality
requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering - in so far
as rough comparisons can be made - of any other being." Singer, Animal
Liberation,9. Accordingly, Singer wants to conclude that eating meat, at least in
cultures where legumes, grains, vegetables and fruits are plentiful, is wrong
because it serves no more worthy interest than culinary pleasure.
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The problem, however, is that the principle of equal consideration seems to
rule out eating only those animals that have been raised and slaughtered under
painful conditions. If animals can be raised and slaughtered in a way that causes them no pain (something that cannot be ruled out a priori), then it seems
that, on Singer's analysis, it would be permissible to eat them. Insofar as the
notion of harm is conceptually linked to the capacity for suffering, it appears to
follow that there is nothing inherently objectionable with killing since killing
need not inflict suffering on the victim.
15. There are problems with this model. The idea that one's ultimate fate
might depend on factors over which one lacks direct volitional control seems
difficult to reconcile with God's moral perfection. For example, eternal damnation seems to be a morally inappropriate fate for someone who is killed five
minutes before he would have accepted the Christian creed. For a discussion
of these issues, see Linda Zagzebski, "Religious Luck," Faith and Philosophy,
vol. 11, no. 3 (July 1994), 397-413; and Scott A. Davison, "Salvific Luck,"
Tnternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 45, no. 2 (April 1999), 129-137.
In any event, the view described above is common enough among Christians
and remains viable in the absence of a compelling alternative.

16. Abelard's Ethics, 137.
17. Don Marquis, "An Argument that Abortion is Wrong," in John Arthur
(ed.), Morality and Moral Controversies, 5th Ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1999), 187-195, 190.
18. Assume that God gives you moral permission to make the choice.
19. Assuming religious pluralism is false, simply eliminating nonChristians results in a sizeable reduction in the number of people eligible for
heaven.
20. Expected value, expected cost, and expected benefit are defined as follows:
Expected benefit (A) = (probability that A occurs)(benefit if A occurs)
Expected cost (A) = (probability that A does not occur)(cost if A does not
occur)
Expected value (A) = Expected benefit (A) +Expected cost (A)
It is worth noting that there are limits to the usefulness of expected value
analysis when we are dealing with costs and benefits that accrue over an eternal interval. For the expected value of a reasonably pleasant eternal afterlife
would be equal to the expected value of an infinitely pleasant eternal afterlife.
Unfortunately, the arithmetic of infinite numbers does not distinguish among
the various afterlives.
This, of course, is not surprising. Ordinary arithmetical operations behave
strangely over infinite numbers. Thus, for example, if you add one countably
infinite set to another, you wind up with a set that is countably infinite.
Indeed, taking the generalized union of a cOlmtably infinite number of countably infinite sets results in a countably infinite set. For a number of interesting
illustrations, see William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith (Crossway Publishers,
1974).
This should not be thought to invalidate the general idea for a couple of reasons. First, one could simply represent the relevant costs and benefits by a
very large finite number and get the same results - and no finite number
would be too large to overvalue the costs of helL Second, since we are not trying to compare one infinite option with another, the relevant problems do not
arise. In any event, I think that, from the standpoint of rational self-interest the
conclusion of the argument is obvious. I am grateful to Phil Goggans for pointing out this issue to me.
21. Indeed, it is worth noting that if you are given a choice between taking
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your chances with a life that carries a substantial risk of eternal damnation and
simply opting for non-existence, the rational thing to do seems to be to choose
non-existence. Relative to the choice above, of course, this would be an especially unhappy decision to make. But it strikes me as the rational one to make if you
are in the position of a fetus with no information about what sort of parents,
character, abilities, and socia-economic circumstances you are likely to have.
22. Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, edited and translated by E.H.
Hong and H.V. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
23. Indeed, the Bible is itself quite explicit in appealing to self-interest: "For
God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whoever
believes in Him should not perish but have everlasting life" (John 3:16).
24. I think it is fair to say that the attitude of believers towards their faith
would change, at least minimally, if God were suddenly to disclose in no
uncertain terms that there would be no life after death.
25. I am indebted to C. Stephen Layman for this point.
26. In this connection, it is important to remember that there is nothing in
Christianity that commits one to a utilitarian theory of sinfulness. Indeed, one
would think that Christianity is committed to a deontological model of sin whether in the form of the divine command theory or in the form of some
other theory.
27. One might also object that allowing abortion would result in moral
harm, but this is not the sort of harm contemplated by the Harm Principle, as it
is understood by liberals.
28. While substance dualism is no longer universally held by Christians, it
remains common enough that the objection deserves consideration here.
29. I am indebted to Celia Wolff for this objection.
30. If, as some believe, contraception is wrong, it is not for this reason.
Traditionally, the argument against contraception is grounded in the idea that
the use of birth control contravenes God's intended purpose for sexual intercourse. The wrong consists, on this line of argument, not in some injury to a
non-existent soul, but in willful abuse of sexual activity.
31. I am also indebted to Celia Wolff for this line of objection.
32. There have been a number of attempts to document the psychological
harms caused by abortion to women and their families, which has come to be
called "Post-Abortion Syndrome." See, e.g., Catherine Barnard, The Long-Term
Psychological Effects of Abortion (Portsmouth, N. H.: Institute for Pregnancy
Loss, 1990).
33. Of course, this line of response does not take into account the physical
harms that would result from the large number of self-induced abortions that
would occur if abortion was prohibited and the psychological harms that
would result to the child of someone who is forced to carry it to term.
34. The Catholic Encyclopedia; available at http://www.newadvent.org/
cathcll/02258b.htm#IX; Internet.
35. Id. There is some controversy about whether such infants are subject to
the torments of hell. On one view, infants who die without baptism are eternally damned. On another, they are "merely" separated from God. There are
two different possibilities here: (1) separation from God with knowledge that
God exists and is forever inaccessible; and (2) separation from God without
knowledge that God exists. While the latter, of course, involves a deprivation,
it is considerably less painful than the former. I am grateful to Jon T. Wheeler
for this latter distinction.
36. Id.
37. It is worth noting that, assuming the fetus is a person, it is not just aborted fetuses that sustain this injury; fetuses that are miscarried also sustain this
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mJury. Any fetus that dies in any manner without the grace of baptism is condemned to being perpetually excluded, on this doctrine, from the vision of God.
38. John T. McNeill (ed.), Calvin: institutes of the Christian Religion
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), IV, XVI, 26.
39. Id., IV, XV, 22.
40. I am grateful to C. Stephen Layman for pointing this out to me.
41. One might argue in response that since we cannot conclusively know
whether God punishes the participation in original sin by infants and fetuses
that die without baptism, we should not risk their eternal damnation by allowing abortion. This is a significantly different application of the pro-life strategy
we encountered earlier in Section 5.2. The objection in that section was that
since we cannot know when ensoulment begins and pre-ensoulment abortion
results in a profound harm, we should not permit abortion at all. It is important to note that this line of objection concedes each of the doctrines adduced in
my argument but it claims that they do not justify allowing abortion.
In contrast, the objection in this context challenges one of the doctrines on
which the argument relies, namely the doctrine of juvenile innocence. The idea
here is that we cannot know whether the doctrine of juvenile innocence is true
and hence should prohibit abortion to prevent this possible harm to the fetus.
While I am inclined to believe that it is obvious that a just God would not
penalize agents conceptually incapable of culpability, it is beyond the scope of
this paper to defend that position. My point here is to show how a coherent
pro-choice position can be constructed out of materials that are open to the
Christian to accept. I do not wish to defend the doctrine of juvenile innocence
here any more than I want to defend the claim that the Harm Principle correctly defines the substantive limits of lawmaking authority. Since coherence is
not the only adequacy criterion, these issues must obviously be resolved at
some point; but this is not the place to do it.
42. One might be tempted to respond to this objection as follows. Just as
there is no way to conclusively determine when personhood begins, there is no
way to conclusively determine when during the life of a child moral awareness
(and hence culpability) begins. Accordingly, there is no way to determine conclusively when during the life of a child premature death subjects a child to the
grave risk of eternal damnation. Since, given the magnitude of the potential
injury, we should never subject any person to even the slightest risk of such an
injury, it follows that infanticide should be legally prohibited. But since we can
be sure that moral awareness cannot occur until after birth, abortion may safely be permitted without subjecting a fetus to such a grave risk.
The problem with this line of reasoning, I think, is that most researchers
who study the psychological, physiological, and neurological characteristics of
infants would argue we can conclusively rule out the possibility of moral
awareness in very young infants. Thus, for example, most medical and psychological researchers would agree that it is just not nomologically possible for
a one-hour-old newborn to have developed moral concepts. Indeed, at that
stage of development, an infant does not even experience the world as being
populated by discrete objects distinct from itself. Given this, it is causally
impossible for a one-hour-old infant to have moral awareness. Thus, a blanket
prohibition on infanticide cannot be justified on the strength of the claim that
we can never determine whether an infant has the relevant cognitive abilities
for moral awareness.
43. I see no reason to think this cannot be done, but this is not a move I
want to attempt here.
44. I am indebted to Phil Goggans and C. Stephen Layman for pointing out
the difficulties with an earlier line of response and for suggesting this one to me.
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45. Jane English, "Abortion and the Concept of a Person," Canadian Journal
of Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 2 (October 1975), 233-243, 241. Hereinafter referred to
as ACP. While English is concerned here with identifying the moral rules we
ought to accept, my concern is with identifying the legal rules we ought to
adopt. Her views can naturally be adapted to this end.
46. Thus, she concludes, for example, that "it would be wrong for a woman
who is seven months pregnant to have an abortion just to avoid having to postpone a trip to Europe" (ACP 242).
47. One possibility, of course, is just the discomfort that is involved in
knowing one's views are extremely unpopular. Liberal Christians are an
unfortunately isolated and much maligned minority among Christians.
48. See, e.g., Dolores E. Dunnett, "Evangelicals and Abortion," Journal of the
Evangelical Theological Society, vol. 33, no. 2 (June 1990), 215-226. As she puts it,
"It seems that when the fetus is able to live outside the mother it is to be considered a valued, actual human being and not just a potential human being.
Actual life takes place, it seems to me, when the fetus is able to survive on its
own outside the womb. Therefore until the fetus is able to exist in this fashion
it is not considered an actual human being as we would consider the mother to
be." Dunnett, "Evangelicals and Abortion," 220-21.
49. See, e.g., Virgina Mollenkott, "Reproductive Choice: Basic to Justice for
Women," Christian Scholar's Review, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1988), 289-296.
50. A prospect that strikes me as extremely unlikely. Indeed, the idea that
personhood begins prior to brain activity strikes me as conceptually incoherent.
51. I am grateful to the following people who commented on earlier versions of this essay: Paul Glezen, Phil Goggans, C. Stephen Layman, Greg
Oakes, and Celia Wolff. The argument is much improved for their thoughtful
objections and suggestions.

